Title page for 964208003


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Student Number 964208003
Author Che-Wei Tang(幾笹)
Author's Email Address luckysoup@hotmail.com
Statistics This thesis had been viewed 1301 times. Download 577 times.
Department Finance
Year 2008
Semester 2
Degree Master
Type of Document Master's Thesis
Language English
Title Following the Leader: A Study of Analysts・
Initial Coverage on Firms
Date of Defense 2009-06-19
Page Count 50
Keyword
  • Analysts・ coverage
  • Lead analysts
  • Most covered firms
  • Neglected firms
  • Abstract This paper examines whether a lead analyst with high ability and more experience will more likely to lead to follow a neglected firm. This paper also investigates whether a lead analyst with high ability and more experience will not likely to lead to follow a most covered firm. Third, we examine whether the market reacts positively to the initial coverage of lead analysts on firms.
    The empirical results show that a lead analyst with more experience may not be more likely lead to follow a neglected firm. Meanwhile, a lead analyst with high ability and more experience may not be likely lead to follow a most covered firm. As to the market reaction, investors do not respond significantly positively to the initial reports issued by a high ability lead analyst or a more experienced lead analyst for a neglected firm. Similarly, investors do not react significantly positively to the initiation issued by a high ability or a more experienced lead analyst for a most covered firm. One possible is that the initial coverage may contain less information since other analysts may have already provided enough information for investors to make investment decisions.
    Table of Content 1. Motivation ............................................................................................................. 1
    2. Literature Reviews ............................................................................................... 2
    2.1 Determinants of Analysts・ Following ............................................................... 2
    2.2 Analysts・ Experience and Ability ...................................................................... 5
    2.3 Lead and Follower ........................................................................................... 6
    2.4 Analysts・ coverage and stock market reaction ................................................. 7
    3. Hypotheses ............................................................................................................ 7
    3.1 Analysts・ Characteristics and Their Add Coverage Decisions for Neglected
    Firms ...................................................................................................................... 7
    3.2 Analysts・ Characteristics and Their Add Coverage Decisions for Most
    Covered Firms ........................................................................................................ 9
    3.3 Analysts・ Initiations and Market Reaction ..................................................... 10
    4. Research Model .................................................................................................. 11
    4.1 Analysts・ characteristics and their add coverage decisions on
    neglected firms ..................................................................................................... 11
    4.2 Analysts・ characteristics and their add coverage decisions on most
    covered firms ........................................................................................................ 16
    4.3 Market Reactions and Analysts・ Coverage Add Decisions .................. 18
    4.3 Data................................................................................................................ 20
    5. Empirical Results ............................................................................................... 21
    5.1 Sample Selection ............................................................................................ 21
    5.2 Descriptive Statistics ...................................................................................... 21
    5.3 Empirical Results ........................................................................................... 23
    5.3.1 Univariate Tests .................................................................................. 23
    5.3.2 Analysts・ Characteristics and Their Coverage Decisions on Neglected
    Firms ............................................................................................................ 26
    5.3.2 Analysts・ Characteristics and Their Coverage Decisions on Most
    Covered Firms .............................................................................................. 34
    5.3.3 Market Reaction to Analysts・ Initial Coverage on Neglected Firms .. 41
    5.3.4 Market Reaction to Analysts・ Initial Coverage on Most covered Firms
    ...................................................................................................................... 41
    6 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 46
    Reference .................................................................................................................... 48
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  • none(葵偵)
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    Date of Submission 2009-06-26

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