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Student Number 954206023
Author Ling-Jyun Ke(柯凌俊)
Author's Email Address No Public.
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Department Graduate Institute of Industrial Management
Year 2007
Semester 2
Degree Master
Type of Document Master's Thesis
Language English
Title A risk-averse supplier’s optimal capacity under forecast sharing
Date of Defense 2008-06-17
Page Count 37
Keyword
  • forecast sharing
  • risk-averse
  • Abstract Although the forecast sharing has been discussed generally and in depth, most of them are considered the agents in the supply chain risk-neutral. But in the practice, the supplier and buyer may have different attitudes toward risk. For this reason, we incorporate risk preference into the forecast sharing model.
    In this model, the supplier sets the entire supply before the selling season and bears all of the supply chain’s inventory risk. We analyze the model by considering the supplier’s attitude toward risk in two scenarios. First, we consider the symmetric forecast information scenario; it means that the supplier considers the forecast information shared by the buyer is creditable. The opposite is asymmetric forecast information scenario, where the supplier does not consider the forecast information provided by the buyer to be credible. Our objective of this paper is not only to analyze the effects of the profits of the supplier and the buyer as well under forecast information sharing on the supplier’s decision in a supply chain with a risk-neutral supplier channel but also a risk-averse one.
    We find out that whether being with symmetric forecast information or not, the supplier’s optimal capacity and profits in both scenarios is smaller as the supplier is risk-averse and the larger the asymmetry is the less profit the supplier gets. Furthermore, we study the degree of the asymmetry and the impact of adding or reducing the value of parameters of our models on the supplier’s optimal capacity, the supplier’s profit and the buyer’s profit
    Table of Content 論文提要I
    AbstractII
    ContentsIII
    List Of FiguresV
    List Of TablesVI
    1Introduction1
    1.1Background1
    1.2Motivation2
    1.3Methodologies3
    1.4Research Objectives3
    1.5Thesis Framework4
    2Literature Review7
    2.1Forecast Sharing7
    2.1.1Full Information7
    2.1.2Asymmetric Forecast Information8
    2.2Risk Preference9
    3The Model14
    3.1Model Description14
    3.2Cooperating With Risk Aversion16
    3.2.1The Symmetric Forecast Information17
    3.2.2The Asymmetric Forecast Information19
    3.2.3Degree Of Forecast Information Asymmetry21
    4Numerical Examples22
    5Sensitivity Analysis25
    5.1Wholesale Price , Setting Cost Per Unit  And Production Cost per unit 25
    5.2The Degree of Forecast Information Asymmetry, 29
    5.3The Risk-averse Parameter a31
    6Conclusion And Future Research33
    6.1Conclusion33
    6.2Future research33
    References35
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    Advisor
  • Ying-chieh Yeh(葉英傑)
  • Files
  • 954206023.pdf
  • approve immediately
    Date of Submission 2008-06-23

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