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Student Number 954206022
Author Cheng-yu Peng(´^¦¨¥k)
Author's Email Address No Public.
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Department Graduate Institute of Industrial Management
Year 2007
Semester 2
Degree Master
Type of Document Master's Thesis
Language English
Title Coordination of Supply chain with consideration of retailer the down-side risk
Date of Defense 2008-06-17
Page Count 43
Keyword
  • coordination supply chain
  • down-side risk
  • wholesale price contract
  • Abstract The supply chain management has been discussed so far, most of them are considered the agents in the supply chain are risk neutral. In the real world, the supplier and retailer may have different attitudes toward risk. For this reason, we incorporate a push contract and the agents have risk preference into the newsvendor model.
    In a push contract, the retailer orders the entire supply before the selling season and bears all of the supply chain¡¦s inventory risk. We analyze the (newsvendor) model by considering the retailer¡¦s attitude toward risk, which is risk neutrality or has down-side risk. If the retailer has down-side risk, we further analyze two cases. In Case 1, the supplier makes a decision without knowing the retailer¡¦s risk preference, and in Case 2, we consider the opposite situation that the supplier knows the retailer¡¦s risk attitude and makes the corresponding decision. We want to realize the relationship between the retailer¡¦s optimal order quantities in Case 1 and the ones in Case 2.
    We find out that the retailer¡¦s optimal order quantity in Case 1 is smaller than the optimal order quantity as the retailer is risk neutral but bigger than the optimal order quantity in Case 2. Furthermore, the supplier facing a down-side risk retailer gets more profit if he knows the retailer¡¦s risk preference. Moreover we provide the Buy-back contract to coordinate the supply chain to get the more profit in these situations.
    Table of Content 1. INTRODUCTION:1
    1.1 Background/Motivation1
    2 LITERATURE REVIEW:6
    2.1Risk preference6
    2.2Contracts for a risk-averse newsvendor6
    2.3Order-quantity decision of a risk-averse for newsvendor7
    3 .Model description:10
    3.1 A risk-neutral retailer13
    3.2 A newsvendor with downside risk constraint13
    3.3 Buy-back Contract18
    4 Numerical example20
    5. Sensitivity Analysis27
    6 Conclusion and future research37
    6.1 Conclusion37
    6.2 Future research37
    References39
    Appendix42
    A1. Proof of proposition A42
    A2. Proof of proposition B42
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    10. Granot, D. and Yin, S. (2004). Competition and cooperation in a multi-manufacturer single-retailer supply chain with complementary products. Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.
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    Advisor
  • Ying-chieh Yeh(¸­­^³Ç)
  • Files
  • 954206022.pdf
  • approve immediately
    Date of Submission 2008-06-23

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